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 WILLIAM W. BERRY III*  
In United States v. Skilling, the Supreme Court used the avoidance 
canon in response to a void-for-vagueness challenge to the federal criminal 
fraud statute.  As explained below, the Court severely restricted the 
statute’s meaning, limiting its proscription against “deprivation of honest 
services” to bribery and kickbacks. 
This Article argues that, contrary to the Court’s decision in Skilling, 
the canon of constitutional avoidance is inappropriate in void-for-
vagueness cases.  This is because such cases do not present statutory 
ambiguity that requires choosing between competing meanings or 
interpretations.  Instead, void-for-vagueness challenges concern statutes 
that either have a constitutionally clear meaning (and are not void-for-
vagueness) or do not have a constitutionally clear meaning (and are void 
for vagueness).  In other words, this Article claims that the absence of 
statutory ambiguity—one interpretation that complies with the Constitution 
and one interpretation that indicates constitutional infirmities—in void-for-
vagueness cases makes the use of the avoidance canon improper in such 
cases. 
Simply put, vague criminal statutes are not inherently ambiguous.  
Instead of offering a choice between two meanings, they are indefinite, 
uncertain, and unclear.  And, it is not the potential meanings of the vague 
statute that create constitutional problems; there is only a constitutional 
problem if there is no ascertainable meaning. 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law and Beccaria Scholar in Criminal Law, University of 
Mississippi; D.Phil., Oxford (UK); J.D. Vanderbilt; B.A. Virginia.  The author would like to 
thank Jack Wade Nowlin for insightful discussions about this topic early in the drafting 
process.  The author also thanks Ellen Podgor, Michael Seigel, Shima Baradaran, Lucian 
Dervan, Katrice Copeland, and Sandra Jordan for helpful suggestions as part of a White 
Collar Crime Panel at the SEALS Conference.  In addition, the author would also like to 
thank Katherine Kimmel for her excellent research assistance on this Article.  Finally, the 
author would like to express his gratitude to the Northwestern Law students on the Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology for their rigorous and thorough editing and Bluebooking 
help on this Article.  
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Part I of this Article explores the justifications for the canon of 
constitutional avoidance.  In Part II, this Article describes the Court’s void-
for-vagueness doctrine and its use of the avoidance canon to circumvent the 
vagueness question in Skilling.  Part III argues that the use of the 
avoidance canon in Skilling was improper and explains why it is not an 
appropriate vehicle to respond to void-for-vagueness constitutional 
challenges to federal criminal statutes.  Part IV explores the negative 
theoretical and practical consequences of applying the avoidance canon to 
potentially vague statutes.  Finally, Part V concludes the Article by 
outlining a model for applying the avoidance canon to other constitutional 
questions involving criminal statutes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[A] resolution to avoid an evil is seldom framed till the evil is so far advanced as to 
make avoidance impossible.” 
—Thomas Hardy1 
 
The canon of constitutional avoidance and the propriety of its use are 
again at the center of academic debate2 following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision to uphold the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.3  In affirming the 
 
1 THOMAS HARDY, FAR FROM THE MADDING CROWD 145 (Doubleday 1998) (1874). 
2 The canon of constitutional avoidance has been the subject of intense academic debate.  
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 815–16 (1983); H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and 
the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313, 1314–18 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander 
Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 72–74; Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 1945, 1946–47 (1997); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, 
and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1551, 1593–99 (2000).  See 
generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 276 (1994) 
(exploring the use of canons in statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public 
Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1020–22, 1066 (1989) 
(suggesting public values analysis as a substantive rationale for constitutional avoidance but 
rejecting the invocation of public values to avoid constitutional doubts when doing so would 
be “inconsistent with legislative supremacy”); Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene 
(McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory 
Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 399–400 (2005); William 
K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 831, 832–35 (2001) (calling for the abandonment of the avoidance canon on separation 
of powers grounds); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. 
REV. 1003, 1004–06 (1994) [hereinafter Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions] 
(offering a critical examination of a subcategory of the avoidance doctrine, the “last resort 
rule”); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court’s 
Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) 
[hereinafter Kloppenberg, Avoiding Doubts] (criticizing the avoidance canon in free speech 
cases); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. 
CT. REV. 223, 228 (criticizing avoidance techniques); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional 
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1196, 1239 (2006) (arguing 
against the use of the avoidance canon in situations where the Executive Branch can interpret 
the text clearly); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 561–75 
(1990) (urging a more transparent constitutional approach to immigration law); John 
Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1497–98 
(1997) (suggesting the abandonment of the canon of avoidance for an alternative 
“unconstitutionality” canon); Harry H. Wellington, Machinists v. Street: Statutory 
Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 50 
(criticizing application of the avoidance canon). 
3 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–94 (2012). 
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individual mandate, Chief Justice John Roberts’s controlling opinion4 
interpreted the ambiguous language of the statute in order to save the 
constitutionality of the statute.5  The four dissenting Justices, on the other 
hand, argued that Justice Roberts’s interpretation contravened Congress’s 
intent by altering the meaning of the plain language of the statute.6 
When the Court invokes the avoidance canon, the first point of 
disagreement is whether it constitutes an exercise of judicial restraint.7  In 
the context of Sebelius, Justice Roberts could argue that he exercised 
judicial restraint by interpreting the statute such that the Court did not strike 
it down.8  The dissenters would argue, though, that interpreting the statute 
consistently with the plain meaning of its text and Congress’s intent 
exercises judicial restraint, even if that means striking the statute down as 
unconstitutional.9 
The second point of contention when the Court uses the avoidance 
canon is whether there are constitutional norms protected by the canon’s 
use.10  Such resistance norms11 provide a penumbral value12 to 
underenforced constitutional provisions.  Thus, in order to escape the 
avoidance doctrine, Congress must be clear about its intent to approach 
constitutional lines.13  The criticism of using the avoidance canon to give 
 
4 The four other Justices in the majority, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, 
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, joined with Chief Justice John Roberts but also voted to 
uphold the statute on Commerce Clause grounds.  Id. at 2617 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
5 Id. at 2594 (majority opinion).  Specifically, Justice Roberts determined that the 
applicable meaning of the ambiguous “penalty” language was that it constituted a “tax,” such 
that passage of the statute fell under Congress’s taxing power.  Id. 
6 Id. at 2651 (joint dissent). 
7 Id. at 2579 (majority opinion). 
8 Id. at 2593–95. 
9 Id. at 2676 (joint dissent). 
10 This justification seems less applicable to the Sebelius case, as the saving construction 
of the statute does not seem to protect any particular constitutional norm. 
11 As explained below, resistance norms are constitutional values, often underenforced, that 
increase in significance when the Court applies the avoidance doctrine, such that their precise 
scope becomes undetermined.  See Young, supra note 2, at 1593; discussion infra Part II. 
12 A penumbra is a partial shadow between regions of complete darkness and complete 
illumination, as in an eclipse.  In legal terms, a penumbra refers to implied powers that 
emanate from a specific rule, thus extending the meaning of the rule into its periphery.  See, 
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them 
life and substance.”). 
13 See Morrison, supra note 2, at 1212; Young, supra note 2, at 1606. 
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value to such norms is that it enables the Judiciary to create a penumbral 
constitution, exceeding its Article III power.14 
To be sure, this debate about the avoidance canon is not new.15  The 
academic literature concerning the justifications for and the shortcomings of 
the canon of constitutional avoidance is well developed.16  But, the 
academic literature has not explored the application of the avoidance 
doctrine to criminal statutes as a class.17  This Article takes a small step in 
that direction.  It explores whether the canon of constitutional avoidance is 
appropriate in cases involving void-for-vagueness challenges to federal 
criminal statutes. 
In Skilling v. United States, the Supreme Court used the avoidance 
canon in response to a void-for-vagueness challenge to the federal criminal 
fraud statute.18  As explained below, the Court severely restricted the 
statute’s meaning, limiting its proscription against deprivation of honest 
services to bribery and kickbacks.19 
This Article argues that, contrary to the Court’s decision in Skilling, 
the canon of constitutional avoidance is inappropriate in void-for-vagueness 
cases.  This is because such cases do not present statutory ambiguity that 
requires choosing between competing meanings or interpretations.  Instead, 
void-for-vagueness challenges focus on the clarity of statutes and ask 
 
14 See Posner, supra note 2, at 816.  The idea is that by using the canon to create a series 
of implied powers, the Court changes the meaning of the constitutional text by adding rights 
and powers not inherent in that text. 
15 See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1949 n.11.  See generally sources cited supra note 2.  
The use of the canon remains highly contested, both in terms whether it is ever appropriate, 
and if so, which situations allow for its use. 
16 See sources cited supra note 2.  
17 I am indebted to Sara Sun Beale for raising this issue at the close of her entertaining 
and insightful “term paper” on Skilling, which illuminates the core arguments and issues in 
the case through a hypothetical discussion between two members of a law faculty.  See Sara 
Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 251 (2010).  She closes her 
article as follows: 
But as noted in my fictional debate, the Supreme Court has not employed the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance or the standards for allowing a facial challenge consistently in criminal 
cases.  Examining the Supreme Court’s application of these doctrines in criminal cases could 
illuminate both the doctrines themselves and their implications for the federal criminal justice 
system.  Scholarship of this nature might address a variety of questions.  In the criminal justice 
context, what factors seem to influence the application of these doctrines?  Is the Court 
influenced, sub silentio, by certain criminal justice policy concerns?  Have the doctrines been 
employed strategically to advance certain policy objectives, and, if so, what objectives?  And 
how do the criminal cases compare to other distinct groups of cases, such as those concerning 
regulatory statutes or voting rights?  Maybe that should be the next debate. 
 Id. at 271–72.  
18 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2928 (2010). 
19 Id. 
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simply whether they are clear enough to satisfy the notice requirements of 
the Constitution.20  In other words, this Article claims that, in void-for-
vagueness cases, the absence of statutory ambiguity—one interpretation 
that complies with the Constitution and one interpretation that indicates 
constitutional infirmities—makes the use of the avoidance canon improper. 
Simply put, vague criminal statutes are not inherently ambiguous.  
Instead of offering a choice between two meanings, they are indefinite, 
uncertain, and unclear.  And, it is not the potential meanings of the vague 
statute that create constitutional problems; there is only a constitutional 
problem if there is no ascertainable meaning. 
Part I of this Article explores the justifications for the canon of 
constitutional avoidance.  In Part II, this Article describes the Court’s void-
for-vagueness doctrine and its use of the avoidance canon to circumvent the 
vagueness question in Skilling.  Part III argues that the use of the avoidance 
canon in Skilling was improper and explains why it is not an appropriate 
vehicle to respond to void-for-vagueness constitutional challenges to 
federal criminal statutes.  Part IV explores the negative theoretical and 
practical consequences of applying the avoidance canon to potentially 
vague statutes.  Finally, Part V concludes the Article by outlining a model 
for applying the avoidance canon to other constitutional questions involving 
criminal statutes. 
I. THE CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN AVOIDANCE CANON 
The canon of constitutional avoidance predates the establishment of 
judicial review.21  A substantive canon,22 its traditional form stated that 
 
20 Statutes do not have to be completely clear to satisfy the requirements of the 
vagueness doctrine.  They just must be clear enough to provide adequate notice to citizens of 
the conduct prohibited by the statute.  See generally Robert Batey, Vagueness and the 
Construction of Criminal Statutes—Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (1997) 
(discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine). 
21 Prior to its decision establishing judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803), the Supreme Court held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 “must, receive a 
construction, consistent with the constitution” and accordingly interpreted the Act to avoid 
causing it to exceed Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction over aliens,  Mossman 
v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 29–30 (1985). 
22 A “substantive” or “normative” canon is one that aims to accomplish a stated judicial 
purpose, here avoiding constitutional decisionmaking as opposed to seeking to ascertain and 
follow the intent of Congress.  See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of 
Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
743, 749 (1992) (stating that “normative canons may or may not coincide with legislators’ 
values or intentions”); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should 
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when deciding “between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of 
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, [a court’s] plain 
duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.”23  Under classical avoidance, 
the court must “reach the issue whether the doubtful version of the statute is 
constitutional [and conclude that it is not] before adopting the construction 
that saves the statute from constitutional invalidity.”24 
Over time, however, the Court broadened this classical version of the 
canon of constitutional avoidance.25  Because the application of the classical 
avoidance canon required the Court to make a constitutional determination 
in deciding whether to apply the canon,26 the Supreme Court modified the 
canon in United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co.27  The Court in that case 
explained that the classical canon in essence required the Court to issue 
advisory opinions.28  To apply the classical avoidance canon, the Court first 
had to decide that one interpretation was unconstitutional.  But, because 
such a determination did not control the outcome of the case—the saving 
construction did—the decision as to the unconstitutional interpretation 
became an advisory opinion.29 
To remedy this defect, the Court broadened the meaning of the canon, 
explaining that: 
[U]nless this rule be considered as meaning that our duty is to first decide that a 
statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary 
because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to be repugnant to 
the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two 
 
Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (claiming that 
normative canons are judicial creations which are driven by policy objectives rather than 
congressional intent); Young, supra note 2, at 1593–99 (explaining that the avoidance canon 
is best understood as a normative canon). 
23 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring in the judgment 
of an equally divided court). 
24 Morrison, supra note 2, at 1203 (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 395 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting)); see also Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1949.  Chief Justice John 
Marshall similarly explained that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate 
of the law of nations if any other possible interpretation remains . . . .”  Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
25 See Morrison, supra note 2, at 1204–07; Vermeule supra note 2, at 1948–49. 
26 See Morrison, supra note 2, at 1204–07; Vermeule supra note 2, at 1948–49. 
27 213 U.S. 366 (1909); see Nagle, supra note 2, at 1496 (identifying Delaware & 
Hudson as “[t]he true culprit” responsible for the rise of modern avoidance). 
28 United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909). 
29 Id. at 407–09; see also Kelley, supra note 2, at 840–41 (explaining how the Court in 
Delaware & Hudson shifted the avoidance canon to its modern form to avoid advisory 
opinions). 
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constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and 
by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.30 
This modern avoidance canon thus requires the Court to choose alternative 
plausible statutory interpretations not just where one interpretation is 
unconstitutional but also where one interpretation gives rise to serious 
constitutional doubts.  As the Court explained in a subsequent case, the 
Delaware & Hudson determination meant that, “[a] statute must be 
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is 
unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.”31 
Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority further highlighted the move in the years that 
followed to cement the modern avoidance canon in the name of judicial 
deference to the Legislature.32  The canon increased legislative deference by 
minimizing the cases in which the Court even reached the question of a 
statute’s constitutionality, much less struck it down.33  Justice Brandeis 
explained: 
The Court has frequently called attention to the “great gravity and delicacy” of its 
function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress; and has restricted exercise 
of this function by rigid insistence that the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to 
actual cases and controversies; and that they have no power to give advisory 
opinions.34 
Thus, the “cardinal principle” of the modern avoidance canon, “which 
‘has for so long been applied by [the] Court that it is beyond debate,’” 
requires merely that the Court make “a determination of serious 
constitutional doubt, and not a determination of unconstitutionality.”35 
B. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE AVOIDANCE CANON 
The justifications for the use of the canon fall generally into two 
categories: judicial restraint and normative justifications.36  The judicial 
 
30 Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 408. 
31 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916). 
32 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 354 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); 
see also, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) 
(describing avoidance of constitutional questions as “a fundamental rule of judicial restraint”). 
33 See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing cases in which the 
Court refused to pass on the constitutionality of a statute despite the “insistence of one who 
has availed himself of its benefits”). 
34 Id. at 345–46.  Justice Brandeis previously outlined seven categories of interpretive 
principles for the Court to use in interpreting statutes including modern avoidance.  Id. at 346–48. 
35 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). 
36 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1020–21; Morrison, supra note 2, at 1202, 1212. 
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restraint theory relies on the idea that the Court should avoid interpretations 
of statutes that raise constitutional doubts in order to respect, to the greatest 
degree possible, legislative decisionmaking.37  As explained below, the 
judicial restraint justification has become less plausible with the application 
of the modern canon.  In many cases, the modern canon results in the Court 
engaging in statutory rewriting that looks very little like restraint.38 
The second primary justification scholars have offered is one of 
constitutional enforcement of resistance norms.39  The avoidance canon thus 
should “give voice to certain normative values,”40 namely “those embodied 
in the underlying constitutional provisions that create the constitutional 
‘doubt.’”41  Under this justification, the overarching norm of the avoidance 
canon is restricting Congress’s ability to legislate to the outer limits of its 
constitutional authority without being explicit about its decision to do so.42 
1. Judicial Restraint 
Under its initial conception of classical avoidance, the Court 
emphasized that “[t]his [avoidance] canon is followed out of respect for 
Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional 
limitations.”43  The modern canon likewise rests on the notion that the 
Court should “minimize disagreement between the branches by preserving 
congressional enactments that might otherwise founder on constitutional 
objections.”44 
Professor Trevor Morrison’s excellent article on the use of the 
avoidance canon in the Executive Branch succinctly summarizes this 
judicial restraint justification for the avoidance canon.45  He explains: 
The combination of classical avoidance, Delaware & Hudson, and Ashwander yields 
the following: 
 
37 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1021; Morrison, supra note 2, at 1202; Vermeule, 
supra note 2, at 1945. 
38 See Schauer, supra note 2, at 74 (criticizing the avoidance canon for this reason).  The 
traditional canon sought only to prevent constitutional interpretations, as opposed to 
avoiding all constitutional doubts, making judicial restraint at least a more plausible 
justification.  See Morrison, supra note 2, at 1202–03. 
39 Morrison, supra note 2, at 1212; Young, supra note 2, at 1585. 
40 Young, supra note 2, at 1585. 
41 Young, supra note 2, at 1551; see also Frickey, supra note 2, at 450. 
42 See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1020–21; Morrison, supra note 2, at 1212. 
43 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); see also FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 
U.S. 298, 306 (1924). 
44 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998). 
45 Morrison, supra note 2, at 1206–07. 
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(1) In keeping with their oath to uphold the Constitution, members of Congress are 
presumed to have intended to legislate within constitutional limits.  As faithful agents 
of the legislature, the federal courts are obliged to honor that legislative intent. 
(2) The values of legislative supremacy and judicial restraint, including the interest in 
mitigating countermajoritarian concerns, direct the courts to avoid, when possible, 
passing on the constitutionality of federal statutes. 
(3) Although the countermajoritarian difficulty is at its most acute when a court 
actually invalidates a statute as unconstitutional, the avoidance canon cannot be 
limited only to those circumstances without requiring the courts to offer advisory 
opinions on constitutional issues.46 
As Morrison notes, however, scholars have criticized this justification 
for the modern canon extensively.47  Professor Frederick Schauer argues, 
for instance, that when the Court uses the avoidance canon, it may abandon 
the best interpretation of the statute at issue in favor of any alternative that 
is “fairly possible,” opening the door both for poor interpretation and 
political activism on the part of the Court.48  Further, it is easy to see how 
rewriting a statute (or at least altering its meaning) in the name of avoiding 
the Constitution does not appear to be an exercise of restraint.  Deriving a 
meaning for a statute that does not flow directly from its text in the name of 
saving it seems much more like activism than restraint. 
Another important criticism of this conception of avoidance is that it 
allows the Court to look beyond congressional intent in interpreting a 
statute.  The avoidance canon does not appear to demonstrate judicial 
restraint when it results in the Court’s interpretation superseding the intent 
of Congress.  This appearance of activism is damaging, even if the Court’s 
reason for doing so is to avoid the Constitution and not to advance a 
contrary normative approach to the one Congress adopted in passing the 
statute.49 
 
46 Id. (footnote omitted).  Professor Philip Frickey has similarly explained: 
Descriptively, the classic justifications for the canon are that it promotes judicial restraint by 
allowing judges to avoid the “delicate process of constitutional adjudication” and its concomitant 
counter-majoritarian difficulties; it coincides with the probable congressional intent preferring 
the ongoing validity of some version of the statute to invalidity as the result of judicial review; 
and it encourages a healthy, cooperative attitude between the Court and Congress by 
“remanding” issues for careful congressional deliberation consistent with the members’ oath of 
office to uphold the Constitution, thereby illuminating the issue not only for Congress but also 
the Court if the issue ever returns to it. 
Frickey, supra note 2, at 446 (footnotes omitted). 
47 See Morrison, supra note 2, at 1208–11. 
48 See Schauer, supra note 2, at 84–86. 
49 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, A Summary of Why We Need More Judicial Activism, 16 
GREEN BAG 2D 449, 452 (2013); Howard M. Wasserman, Reappropriating Judicial 
Activism, 16 GREEN BAG 2D, 463–64 (2013).  
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2. Resistance Norms 
A second justification for the avoidance canon is its ability to give a 
voice to underenforced constitutional norms.  Professor Ernest Young 
provides a robust account of this justification, describing it as a rule that is 
“designed not to reflect what Congress might have wanted under particular 
conditions, but rather to give voice to certain normative values.”50  These 
values are the ones that give rise to the constitutional doubt.  Young’s 
account explains that, in some cases, the avoidance canon can provide a 
penumbral expression of an underenforced constitutional norm.51  In other 
words, the canon protects the norm by avoiding an interpretation of a statute 
that approaches the norm unless Congress has clearly stated intent to the 
contrary. 
William Eskridge has similarly explained that, understood in this 
context, the avoidance canon “makes it harder for Congress to enact 
constitutionally questionable statutes and forces legislators to reflect and 
deliberate before plunging into constitutionally sensitive issues.”52  The 
canon thus protects the constitutional norm by preventing Congress from 
approaching the line between what is constitutional and unconstitutional, 
unless Congress clearly articulates its intention to legislate to the edge of 
that boundary.53 
The resistance norm account of the canon provides a more defensible 
justification than the judicial restraint account.  First, the criticism of the 
canon that it undermines Congress’s statutory intent carries less weight if 
the goal of the canon is to protect constitutional norms from congressional 
infringement.54  Second, Judge Richard Posner’s argument that the 
avoidance canon promotes the development of a penumbral constitution 
“[b]ecomes just a restatement of the canon’s point, not an indictment of 
it.”55 
 
50 Young, supra note 2, at 1585; see also Morrison, supra note 2, at 1212 (highlighting 
the same concept). 
51 Young, supra note 2, at 1585. 
52 ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 286; see also Morrison, supra note 2, at 1216 (highlighting 
the same idea). 
53 ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 286.  A possible analogy here would be to a new dating 
relationship in which neither member of the couple has defined the extent of the relationship 
(or its boundaries with reference to dating others).  The relationship might have a greater 
perceived reality (penumbral presence) as long as the couple does not have a “define-the-
relationship” (DTR) conversation.  In other words, the Supreme Court, in this context, will 
avoid pressing the issue unless Congress insists on defining the relationship, that is, the 
scope of the constitutional provision. 
54 Morrison, supra note 2, at 1209. 
55 Id. at 1213; see also Posner, supra note 2, at 816. 
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C. THE AMBIGUITY ASSUMPTION OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON 
Importantly, the avoidance canon is a substantive canon.56  This means 
that it serves to protect the substance—the underlying values—of the 
Constitution.  The Supreme Court has described the canon as follows: 
“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid 
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”57 
Underlying this basic framing of the canon is the understanding that it 
exists to resolve disputed questions of statutory meaning.  The avoidance 
canon thus exists to put a thumb on the scale in favor of the interpretation 
that avoids the constitutional problem. 
The decision of whether to invoke the canon arises where there is a 
latent statutory ambiguity.  Without an open question of statutory 
interpretation, the avoidance canon is not relevant to the Court’s 
decisionmaking.  Whenever the Court invokes the canon, it thus presumes 
(1) an open question of what a statute means based on ambiguous language 
that suggests two or more possible meanings, and (2) one of the possible 
meanings raises doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute. 
II. VAGUENESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST VAGUENESS 
The precise origins of the constitutional prohibition against vagueness 
are not clear, as the concept was initially primarily a principle of 
construction focusing on notice.58  Notice encompasses the idea that a 
potential offender must have a reasonable opportunity to know what 
potential behavior is criminal.59  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
 
56 See, e.g., Young, supra note 2, at 1593–96 (explaining that the avoidance canon is best 
understood as a normative canon).  
57 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
58 Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for 
Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 263–64 (2010); Note, Void 
for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. L.J. 272, 275 (1948) (“Neither 
The Federalist nor the records of debates of the Constitutional Convention and the ratifying 
conventions indicate that the concept was considered a serious issue, if an issue at all.”). 
59 See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 205–06 (1985) (“At least within the political tradition of liberal 
democracy, the essentiality of notice seems obvious, and the perceived unfairness of 
punishment without warning requires no explication.”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 588 (2001) (“A necessary condition of any 
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explained in Nash v. United States, “the criminality of an act cannot depend 
upon whether a jury may think it reasonable or unreasonable.  There must 
be some definiteness and certainty.”60 
Over time, this limiting construction became a part of the due process 
requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  As the Court 
indicated, “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due 
process of law.”61  And the Court applied this doctrine to criminal statutes: 
“[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as 
to the meaning of penal statutes.  All are entitled to be informed as to what 
the State commands or forbids.”62 
At the heart of the constitutional prohibition against vagueness is the 
concept of fair notice.  As the Court has explained, “[t]he constitutional 
requirement that a criminal statute be definite serves a high function.  It 
gives a person acting with reference to the statute fair warning that his 
conduct is within its prohibition.”63  Nonetheless, the Court has never 
required perfect clarity to survive a vagueness challenge.  Rather, the 
prohibition only requires a statute “to provide a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited,”64 as the Court has “eschewed 
the idea of perfect clarity or mathematical certainty.”65 
To satisfy due process, then, “a penal statute [must] define the criminal 
offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”66  This standard allows for facial 
 
free society is the ability to avoid going to prison; one has that ability only if one can know 
what behavior will lead to prosecution and punishment.”). 
60 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (quoting Justice David Brewer’s 
opinion from when he sat in the circuit court in Tozer v. United States, 52 F. 917, 919 (E.D. 
Mo. 1892)).  Justice Holmes qualified this statement with respect to the Sherman Act, noting: 
“But apart from the common law as to restraint of trade . . . the law is full of  instances where a 
man’s fate depends upon his rightly estimating, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, 
some matter of degree.”  Id.; see also Lockwood, supra note 58, at 268. 
61 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); see also Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926); Lockwood, supra note 58, at 268–69. 
62 Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453; see also Lockwood, supra note 58, at 267 (explaining the 
significance of the Court’s statement and application of the vagueness doctrine in Lanzetta). 
63 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103–04 (1945); see also Lockwood, supra note 
58, at 269 (finding this quote from the Court in Screws a “repeated reference”).  
64 Lockwood, supra note 58, at 270 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). 
65 Id. at 271. 
66 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (numbering added).  
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and as-applied challenges, depending on the statute at issue.67  The Skilling 
case provides an example of the latter.68 
B. UNITED STATES V. SKILLING 
In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. 
Skilling, one of a triumvirate of cases69 concerning the scope of the then-
effective federal criminal “honest-services” fraud statute.70  This statute 
defined the “scheme or artifice to defraud” language of the federal mail and 
wire fraud statute71 as depriving another of “the intangible right of honest 
services.”72  In Skilling, former Enron executive Jeffrey Skilling challenged 
his federal criminal conviction under the honest-services fraud statute73 
because, among other things, he claimed that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct.74 
The Court, however, avoided the constitutional issue altogether, 
holding that “the intangible right of honest services” included only bribery 
and kickbacks.75  Clearly not a textual reading of the statutory language,76 
the Court instead relied on its review of the cases decided under the prior 
honest-services fraud statute77 that the Court had struck down twenty years 
earlier in McNally v. United States.78  The Court reasoned that Congress’s 
adoption of the honest-services statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, sought to 
include the types of crimes, namely bribery and kickbacks, that had been 
brought under the prior statute.79  This approach required a strained reading 
 
67 See, e.g., Lockwood, supra note 58, at 286–87. 
68 See generally United States v. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
69 The Court’s decision in Skilling largely resolved the similar issues petitioners raised in 
Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (per curiam), and Black v. United States, 
130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010).  
70 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2010). 
71 Id. §§ 1341, 1343. 
72 Id. § 1346. 
73 Skilling also challenged the voir dire procedure, the process of selecting jurors, but the 
Court held that the voir dire challenge was without merit.  Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2918–23. 
74 Skilling’s alleged deprivation of honest services consisted of his misleading Enron 
shareholders concerning information about the company and its financial health.  Id. at 2907–08. 
75 Id. at 2928. 
76 As indicated above, the relevant statutory language provides that “the term ‘scheme or 
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of 
honest services.”  18 U.S.C. § 1346. 
77 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1987). 
78 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (holding that the mail fraud statute was “limited in scope to 
the protection of property rights” and “[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more 
clearly than it has”). 
79 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2906. 
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of the prior cases to conclude that honest services only applied to bribery 
and kickbacks.80 
The Skilling Court based its decision to avoid the constitutional issue 
on the long-held canon of constitutional avoidance.81  As described above, 
this substantive canon mandates that, in cases where two plausible 
interpretations of a statute exist and one interpretation will raise serious 
doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute, the Court should choose the 
alternative interpretation.82  The Court explained that “[i]n urging 
invalidation of § 1346, Skilling swims against our case law’s current, which 
requires us, if we can, to construe, not condemn, Congress’ enactments.”83  
Citing Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, the Court emphasized 
the strong presumption against striking down federal statutes on vagueness 
grounds.84 
 
80 In fact, the pre-McNally cases included a wide variety of actions under the rubric of 
“deprivation of honest services” that did not involve kickbacks or bribes.  See generally, e.g., 
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916) (mail fraud); United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 
94 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); 
United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Von Barta, 
635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980) (employee depriving employer of his right to loyal and honest 
services via mail and wire fraud); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979) 
(depriving the people of a state their right to honest and faithful execution of the duties of the 
governor via mail fraud); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(impersonating an officer or employee of the United States); United States v. Brown, 540 
F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976) (extorting payments for apartment rentals); United States v. 
O’Malley, 535 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1976) (wire fraud); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 
1388 (2d Cir. 1976) (defrauding shareholders of a corporation through incomplete proxy 
statements); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975) (effort by city official to 
deprive citizens of Chicago of honest services via mail fraud); United States v. Keane, 522 
F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) (mail fraud); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(election fraud); Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967) (mail fraud); 
Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1958) (same). 
81 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 389 
(1909) (“[E]ven if such unconstitutionality were not clear, but were merely doubtful, it 
would be the duty of the court to avoid an unnecessary construction of the statute which 
would develop such constitutional doubts.”); see also discussion supra Part I.A. 
82 A companion doctrine is the severability doctrine, which addresses when the Court 
should permit the statute to survive by striking down only the unconstitutional part of the 
statute.  See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27, 265 (2005) (holding that 
the Sentencing Reform Act violated the Sixth Amendment but could be preserved by 
severing the portion of the Act that made the Sentencing Guidelines “mandatory”).  For an 
interesting discussion of the relationship between the avoidance canon and the doctrine of 
severability, see Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1946–47. 
83 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
84 Id. (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 
571 (1973)). 
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Interestingly, in Letter Carriers, the Court considered whether the 
phrase “political activity” was unconstitutionally vague.85  The Letter 
Carriers Court, in upholding the statute, construed the statute by citing to 
the federal regulations promulgated by the Civil Services Commission that 
defined the permissible and impermissible “political activities.”86  Unlike in 
Skilling, where the Court used common law precedents as the basis for 
interpreting the statute, the Letter Carriers Court applied a federal 
regulation to explain the meaning of a vague statute.  In other words, the 
Court did not avoid the vagueness issue in Letter Carriers.  Instead, it 
decided it. 
Nonetheless, the Skilling Court used Letter Carriers as its basis for 
construing the honest-services statute such that it was no longer vague.87  
Ironically, the Court did not have to “construe” the statute by limiting its 
meaning; it simply had to determine whether the statute was too vague to 
decide whether Skilling’s conduct fell within its meaning.  The 
consequence of applying this canon in Skilling was that the Court 
essentially rewrote the statute.  The language “deprivation of the intangible 
right to honest services,” which had previously covered a wide variety of 
conduct, now applies only to bribery and kickbacks.88  This legislative-type 
decisionmaking in the name of avoiding potential doubts about the 
constitutionality of the statute raises questions about the propriety of the 
canon of constitutional avoidance itself.  Indeed, many commentators have 
criticized the use of the canon of constitutional avoidance, and even those 
who support its use suggest that the Court should apply it narrowly.89 
Despite the criticism of the canon, if restricting the statute to cover 
only bribery and kickbacks was one of several possible meanings of “honest 
services,” then the Court’s use of the avoidance canon would have been 
consistent with its prior usage.  Instead, the meaning of the phrase “honest 
 
85 Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 568. 
86 Id. at 575–77. 
87 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2930. 
88 Indeed, federal prosecutors have long enjoyed the simplicity and flexibility of this 
language in prosecuting fraud cases and have likewise considered it to be a valuable 
prosecutorial weapon.  See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 
DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980) (referring to the mail fraud statute as the “true love” of white-
collar prosecutors). 
89 See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 2, at 832–35 (calling for the abandonment of the 
avoidance canon on separation of powers grounds); Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional 
Questions, supra note 2, at 1004–06 (offering a critical examination of a subcategory of the 
avoidance doctrine, the “last resort rule”); Kloppenberg, Avoiding Doubts, supra note 2, at 4 
(criticizing the avoidance canon in free speech cases); Manning, supra note 2, at 228 
(criticizing avoidance techniques); Morrison, supra note 2, at 1196, 1239 (arguing against 
the use of the avoidance canon in situations where the Executive Branch can interpret the 
text clearly). 
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services” contained no ambiguity; no competing meanings of the phrase 
existed.  Indeed, the issue in the case was not what “honest services” meant 
or included.  The issue was whether the term “honest services” was too 
vague to have any intelligible meaning at all.  And the Court “avoided” this 
constitutional question by rewriting the statute and changing its meaning.90 
III. “CRIMINAL” CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 
Having explained the relevant background of the avoidance canon and 
its use in Skilling, this Part argues that its use in Skilling was improper, and 
more broadly, that any use in criminal cases with vagueness challenges is 
improper.  Specifically, by confusing the concepts of vagueness and 
ambiguity, the Skilling Court abdicated its role as a court while 
simultaneously and improperly engaging in the role of a legislature.  For the 
same reasons, the canon is improper in all vagueness cases. 
A. VAGUENESS, NOT AMBIGUITY 
The central shortcoming of the Court’s decision in Skilling is the 
Court’s confusion of the concepts of vagueness and ambiguity.  As 
discussed above, the ambiguity that gives rise to the potential use of the 
avoidance canon occurs where statutory language has two (or more) 
possible meanings, one of which is constitutionally infirm.  The Court can 
then apply the canon by choosing the meaning that does not create the 
constitutional issue, or alternatively, by resolving the constitutional problem 
on the merits. 
In Skilling, though, the question before the Court was whether the 
federal fraud statute (prohibiting deprivation of honest services) was, as 
applied, void-for-vagueness.  There were not two competing meanings of 
“honest services” to choose between in applying the statute.  Rather, the 
question concerned whether the statutory language provided adequate 
notice concerning the criminal nature of Skilling’s conduct.  Skilling argued 
that the “deprivation of honest services” prohibition did not clearly give 
notice of what conduct violated the statute, and thus as applied, was void-
for-vagueness under the requirements of the Due Process Clause.  Skilling 
did not claim that any particular substantive application or interpretation of 
the statutory language resulted in the statute’s unconstitutionality.  Instead, 
the application of the statute created the constitutional problem.  Its scope 
 
90 Federal prosecutors have pursued a countless number of cases under the “honest-
services” doctrine that had nothing to do with bribery or kickbacks.  See supra note 80 
(providing numerous pre-McNally cases where this occurred).  Indeed, before Skilling, the 
government had prosecuted many crimes under the prior statutory regime that did not 
involve bribery or kickbacks.  See id. 
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was indefinite, according to Skilling, such that it was difficult to ascertain a 
clear limit on what conduct fell under the statute and what conduct did not. 
The proper choice before the Court, then, was whether Skilling was 
correct on the merits of his constitutional claim that the statute was 
impermissibly vague.  There was no question of ambiguity in the statute 
and thus no opportunity to consider whether the avoidance canon should 
apply.  Put another way, interpreting the scope of the statute was the 
constitutional question.  To question whether the Constitution applied to 
Skilling’s argument was disingenuous.  The analytical move the Court 
made, then, was to ignore the question before it and rewrite the statute to 
remove the constitutional question.  This is certainly a very different 
enterprise than choosing between two possible interpretations of a statute.  
As explained in more detail below, this interpretation resulted both in the 
Court abdicating its role as a court and improperly acting as a legislature. 
B. THE COURT ABDICATING ITS ROLE AS A COURT 
In choosing to employ the canon of constitutional avoidance in the 
context of void-for-vagueness cases like Skilling, the Court abdicates its 
role as a court.  As a court, its primary role is to resolve cases or 
controversies.91  As indicated above, Skilling’s primary claim was that the 
vagueness of the statutory language violated his due process right to notice.  
Given the alleged vagueness of the statutory language, the Court’s proper 
role was to determine the constitutional acceptability of its application to 
Skilling’s conduct. 
Dating back to Marbury v. Madison, the interpretation of the 
Constitution and its application to federal statutes has been at the heart of 
the Court’s judicial review.92  Judicial review, however, provides the Court 
with a number of different legitimate options to resolve cases, and in using 
these options, the Court must balance a number of competing interests 
when assessing whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague.93  For 
instance, the defendant’s interest in receiving notice is much greater when 
the criminal statute proscribes conduct that is malum prohibitum94 as 
opposed to conduct that is malum in se.95  The Court can also limit the 
 
91 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
92 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 887, 887 (2003). 
93 Id. at 919–20. 
94 Malum prohibitum conduct is conduct that is illegal because the state decides it is so.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1045 (9th ed. 2009).  This conduct is a crime “merely because it 
is prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral.”  Id. 
95 Malum in se conduct is conduct that is illegal because it is an evil unto itself.  See id. 
at 1045 (“A crime or an act that is inherently immoral, such as murder, arson, or rape.”).  
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impact of a challenge to the statute by resolving the challenge “as applied” 
instead of in a facial manner.  As a result, the statute can be vague as to 
some acts but not others.96  The Court certainly could have adopted such an 
approach in Skilling.  Further, in situations where the need for notice falls 
below the need for criminal enforcement in a particular area, the Court can 
apply the void-for-vagueness standard narrowly, limiting its scope. 
But when the Court uses the avoidance canon to skirt the constitutional 
claim and there is no other claim related to the statute, the Court is 
abdicating its role.  In Skilling, the defendant was not asking the Court to 
determine the meaning of the statute; he wanted the Court to assess whether 
the statute itself, as constituted, satisfied one of the basic requirements of 
criminal statutes: absence of vagueness. 
To make this clear, it is helpful to contrast the void-for-vagueness 
claim with the rule of lenity.  The rule of lenity requires courts to construe 
ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the defendant.97  Thus, where a 
federal criminal statute’s language leaves it susceptible to several 
competing meanings, the court that follows the rule of lenity will choose the 
one most favorable to the defendant.  The ambiguity is construed against 
the drafter—the government.  By contrast, there is no substantive 
interpretation of the statutory text in the context of vagueness.  The court 
does not determine whether specific conduct falls under the criminal 
statute; it assesses whether the level of specificity in the statute’s language is 
sufficient. 
Unlike lenity, then, the court’s task is not to determine the meaning of 
the statute.  Instead, it is to determine whether the specificity of a statute (or 
lack thereof) allows one to adequately determine its meaning.  Adopting a 
presumption against striking down federal statutes on vagueness grounds, 
as the Court has,98 is an acceptable approach to statutory interpretation.  
Ignoring the question of vagueness entirely, and thereby eschewing its role 
as a court, is not. 
 
96 See Lockwood, supra note 58, at 286–91 (discussing the Court’s developing doctrine 
with respect to “as-applied” and “facial” vagueness challenges). 
97 See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (declining to apply the rule 
of lenity); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 289 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
rule of lenity compels adoption of the narrower interpretation.”); McNally v. United States, 
483 U.S. 350, 375 (1987) (finding the rule of lenity inapplicable). 
98 See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33, 36 (1963) 
(finding not vague the Robinson-Patman Act, which makes it a federal crime to sell goods at 
“unreasonably low prices” in order to destroy competitors, and finding that a “strong 
presumptive validity . . . attaches to an Act of Congress”); John F. Decker, Addressing 
Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 241, 247 (2002) (stating that an “elementary, but critical, point in this type of challenge 
is that courts begin their analysis with the presumption that the statute under attack is valid”).  
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C. THE COURT ACTING AS A LEGISLATURE 
In addition to failing to fulfill its role as a court, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Skilling also resulted in it adopting another branch’s role, acting 
as a legislature.  This is probably the most troubling part of the Court’s 
decision.  Certainly, the Supreme Court—and all courts for that matter—
engage in rulemaking on a number of different levels.  Courts have a long 
history of deciding common law cases and extrapolating new rules from 
prior cases. 
When interpreting statutes, the courts likewise enjoy wide latitude to 
determine the meaning of legislative language.  This freedom of 
interpretation has led the courts, in many cases, to go far beyond the plain 
textual language to ascertain its meaning, often considering such other 
indicia as legislative intent, legislative purpose, underlying policy 
considerations, and other comparable provisions or laws.99  The result of 
this dynamic statutory interpretation is often the court significantly adding 
to or subtracting from the plain meaning of the statutory text.  The Supreme 
Court itself has often engaged in such interpretive exercises such that the 
final product appears to constitute a rewriting of the statute, at least in the 
sense that its meaning is different from its plain language.100 
Such an interpretation, though, is an acceptable exercise of judicial 
review, because there are limits on the Court’s exercise of this discretion.  
The Court’s policy choices cannot exist apart from the case or controversy.  
Indeed, the statutory language and the question before the Court cabin its 
discretion to engage in ad hoc rewriting of federal statutes. In the Skilling 
case specifically and in the void-for-vagueness context more generally, 
however, the Court is not engaging in the exercise of statutory 
interpretation when it uses the avoidance canon.  Rather, it is engaged in the 
legislative activity of rewriting a statute. 
The decision to use the avoidance canon in Skilling resulted in the 
Court making a normative judgment about the content of the statute rather 
than assessing its vagueness as written.  The normative judgment concerned 
which kinds of conduct ought to be criminal.  In saving bribery and 
kickbacks, the Court did not assess whether the many other types of 
prosecutions previously brought under the statute were part of the statute.  
 
99 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the 
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1096–
99 (2001) (discussing the importance of context in interpreting statutory texts); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 321, 353–62 (1990) (explaining the relationship between and hierarchy of these 
interpretive tools). 
100 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 510 (1959); Machinists v. Street, 367 
U.S. 740, 784-85 (1961). 
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Instead, it concluded that it could clearly define bribery and kickbacks, and 
as a result, those acts survived.  In doing so, though, the Court legalized 
much of the previously criminal conduct under the statute.  For instance, 
many kinds of fraud involving intangible self-dealing where one uses gifts 
and services to curry favor from organizations or politicians while failing to 
disclose one’s interests are no longer criminal.101 
Even more troubling, though, was that the Court did not carefully 
consider as a matter of policy whether such acts ought to be criminal.  
Perhaps to mask the legislative exercise it undertook or simply because it 
lacked the inclination to explore its policy choices, the Court nonetheless 
rewrote a federal criminal statute largely without policy explanation.  Its 
purported justification, Congress’s pre-McNally intent, falls short on two 
accounts.  First, it is clear that Congress intended the statute to be more than 
a limit on bribery and kickbacks because the prior cases said so,102 and it 
did not amend the legislation during the next twenty-one years.  Second, 
there was no ambiguity about what Congress intended to regulate—honest 
services.  If Congress had only intended to restrict bribery and kickbacks 
under the statute, it could easily have said so. 
Further, the question before the Court was not what the scope of 
“honest services” was; rather, it was whether one could identify the scope at 
all.  The paradigm shift by the Court reflected its activist posture of acting 
as a legislature, not a court.  Finally, there is nothing to indicate Skilling 
was a special case.  Indeed, two other identical cases, Weyhrauch and 
Black, were on the docket.103  Rather, the distinction between ambiguity and 
vagueness extends to all void-for-vagueness challenges. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF MISUSING THE AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE 
A. THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES 
As this Part demonstrates, the avoidance canon cannot meet its goals 
when applied to potentially vague criminal statutes.  The issue of vagueness 
is different from ambiguity, and so applying the canon in this context 
creates a paradigm shift with ironic consequences.  Indeed, not only does 
applying the avoidance canon to vagueness challenges undermine its goals, 
but applying the vagueness doctrine itself also better achieves those same 
goals. 
 
101 See Elizabeth R. Sheyn, Criminalizing the Denial of Honest Services After Skilling, 
2011 WIS. L. REV. 27, 55 (2011). 
102 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2010) (defined in 1988 by 18 U.S.C. § 1346 in response to the 
Court’s holding in McNally); see also cases mentioned supra note 80.  
103 See generally Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010); Weyhrauch v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (per curiam). 
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1. Misusing the Avoidance Canon Undermines Its Goals 
When the Court applies the avoidance canon to vague statutes, it 
undermines the purposes of the canon itself in two ways.  First, to the extent 
that the Court attempts to exercise judicial restraint, it does not achieve that 
purpose.  Applying the avoidance doctrine to vagueness statutes will often 
result in the Court rewriting the statute in the name of saving it.  The Court 
in Skilling avoided the vagueness question by limiting the meaning of 
“honest services” to bribery and kickbacks and excluded all other forms of 
honest services.  It is clear that the Court’s use of the canon changed the 
meaning of the statute, legalizing formerly illegal behavior.104  The apparent 
value of avoiding the constitutional question of vagueness as indicum of 
judicial restraint also is not present here.  The Court did not defer to 
Congress by finding a means to avoid striking down a federal criminal 
statute.  Circumscribing the meaning of a potentially vague provision, by 
definition, does not preserve its meaning.  Rather, by narrowing the 
meaning of a vague statute in the name of avoidance, the Court struck down 
at least part of the statute.  In essence, the application of the avoidance 
canon to vague statutes such as that in Skilling actually decides the 
constitutional issue the Court seeks to avoid by discarding some possible 
meanings of the statute when it limits (and often rewrites) its scope.105  The 
decision to limit honest-services fraud to bribery and kickbacks was, at its 
heart, a determination that other potential types of honest services were too 
vague to remain part of the statute.  The Court’s exercise of avoidance, 
then, had the effect of deciding the constitutional issue by drawing a line 
between what was constitutionally clear enough (bribery and kickbacks) 
and what was unconstitutionally vague (all other interpretations of “honest 
services”). 
Second, the use of the avoidance canon with potentially vague statutes 
does not achieve its goal of giving penumbral value to underenforced 
constitutional norms.  To the contrary, applying the avoidance canon in this 
context undermines the resistance norm purpose entirely.  The 
constitutional value of notice—being aware of the scope of a criminal 
statute—does not increase by the Court avoiding the question of where to 
draw the line as to vagueness.  Instead, by failing to define the 
constitutional line as to the level of specificity required in a criminal statute, 
 
104 See Sheyn, supra note 101. 
105 See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1333 (2010) 
(choosing not to apply avoidance to a vagueness question and explaining that 
“[t]he avoidance canon . . . is a tool for choosing between competing plausible 
interpretations of a statutory text,” and that “[i]n applying that tool, we will consider only 
those constructions of a statute that are fairly possible” (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)). 
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the Court minimizes the underlying value—the notice of the scope of the 
criminal prohibition.  The penumbral purpose of the avoidance canon seeks 
to do just the opposite.  Notice, however, is not a value to which one 
accords meaning by avoiding definition.  By leaving the answer to the 
constitutional question—is the statute too vague?—unanswered, the 
application of the avoidance canon diminishes the constitutional value of 
notice. 
By avoiding the constitutional question in Skilling and simply 
rewriting the statute, the Court has not provided Congress with any 
guidance on how specific it must be when it attempts to rewrite the honest-
services fraud statute to include other types of conduct besides bribery and 
kickbacks.  As a result, the value of notice (the required level of specificity) 
loses force because Congress does not know how far notice must extend.   
Ironically, then, the consequence of applying the avoidance canon for 
the constitutional value at issue is that the value here (notice) does not 
become any more of an impediment to Congress’s construction of the 
statute than before.  This is because notice is a value that increases with 
definition, not ambiguity.  In other words, notice is valuable to a citizen 
when it is specific and clear.  Being on notice of an ambiguous criminal 
prohibition is unhelpful precisely because the ambiguity inhibits the ability 
of a citizen to understand, and thus be on notice of, the proscribed 
behavior.106 
2. Vagueness Better Achieves the Goals of Avoidance 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on the avoidance doctrine for addressing 
the constitutionality of criminal statutes becomes perhaps even more 
disturbing when one considers that the vagueness doctrine itself better 
achieves the two goals of the avoidance canon: judicial restraint and 
penumbral protection of underenforced constitutional norms.  In other 
words, the Court can better achieve the goals of the avoidance canon by 
choosing not to apply it to potentially vague criminal statutes. 
The vagueness doctrine better achieves these goals in two ways.  First, 
answering the question of whether a statute is vague achieves a greater 
degree of judicial restraint than does applying the avoidance canon.  If the 
Court upholds the statute as providing the required degree of constitutional 
specificity, then the statute remains intact, demonstrating more restraint 
than rewriting the statute.  Although counterintuitive, striking down the 
statute as vague also exercises more judicial restraint than rewriting it.  
Declaring the statute unconstitutional delineates the scope of specificity 
required, but allows Congress to determine how close it wants to go to the 
 
106 See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 59, at 205–12; Stuntz, supra note 59, at 588. 
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constitutional line.  In Skilling, for example, Congress and not the Court 
would then decide what specific conduct constitutes “honest services.” 
Another way to understand this idea is in the context of potentially 
vague statutes.  Avoiding the constitutional question in this context requires 
the Court to define the substance of the statute, and in most cases, to limit 
its scope.  Addressing the constitutional question of vagueness, on the other 
hand, simply requires the Court to set the boundary for the acceptable level 
of specificity, leaving the substance to the discretion of Congress.  Indeed, 
the Court better achieves the purpose of judicial restraint by deciding the 
vagueness question. 
Second, the Court can better preserve the penumbral value of 
potentially vague statutes by deciding the vagueness question, not avoiding 
it.  According the value of notice more significance means giving it greater 
definition, not less.  If the Court upholds the statute, the Court provides 
Congress with an example of a statute that satisfies the specificity 
requirement, defining what constitutes acceptable notice.  On the other 
hand, if the Court strikes down the statute, it sets a floor as to the 
constitutional value of notice.  The value of notice, then, gains more 
constitutional force because it has greater definition—the minimum level of 
specificity becomes a prerequisite for all statutes.  Addressing the 
vagueness question, then, achieves the penumbral goal of the avoidance 
canon.  It gives greater scope and significance to the constitutional value at 
issue—fair notice. 
B. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES 
In addition to failing to achieve its constitutional and philosophical 
goals, the avoidance canon also has unfortunate practical consequences 
when it is applied to potentially vague criminal statutes.  One of the most 
significant of these is that formerly criminal conduct becomes legal under 
the statute.  After Skilling, for instance, many types of fraud formerly under 
the scope of the statute,107 particularly in the intangible services context, fall 
outside of the scope of federal law and, for all practical purposes, have 
become legal. 
 
107 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (prohibiting devising “any scheme or artifice to defraud” 
in a provision separate from fraud to obtain money or property but not defining “deprivation 
of honest services” as such), with 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (adding a separate provision defining 
fraud as “deprivation of honest services”); see also Judge Pamela Mathy, Honest Services 
Fraud After Skilling, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 645, 666–70 (2011) (noting that § 1346 was 
Congress’s “legislative fix” in response to McNally). 
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1. Not Covered by Statute 
As indicated above, the Court in Skilling limited the definition of 
“deprivation of honest services” to bribery and kickbacks.  In the name of 
protecting the statute, the Court sacrificed much of its content.  If 
“deprivation of honest services” only includes bribery and kickbacks, a 
wide variety of previously criminal conduct now remains unreachable by 
prosecutors.108  The most obvious example of previously criminal conduct 
are breaches of fiduciary duties or undisclosed self-dealing where the 
conduct does not directly involve money or property.109  In practice, such 
breaches of fiduciary duties or undisclosed self-dealing occur when 
individuals use gifts or services to gain favor.110  Specifically, this method 
of persuasion accompanies a failure to disclose financial interests in certain 
entities.  This is particularly true where the funneling of business to those 
entities happens by virtue of particular position or status.111 
Of course, a number of issues remain in terms of delineating the scope 
of such criminal liability—i.e., when such behavior rises to the level of 
fraud.  The relationship forming the basis of the fiduciary duty, the level of 
intent required to show honest-services fraud, and whether actual economic 
harm is necessary to establish a claim are all crucial issues that must be part 
of any new honest-services fraud statute.112  Regardless of where one comes 
down at the margins, it is clear that one consequence of Skilling is to inhibit 
prosecution of behavior formerly deemed fraudulent. 
2. Not Covered by States 
Many of the behaviors outlined above are clearly illegal or, at the very 
least, have a history of being criminalized in the United States.  The federal 
legalization of many types of fraud resulting from Skilling might not be a 
problem if state criminal law adequately regulated such conduct.  
Unfortunately, states lack two ingredients—appropriate state statutes and 
prosecutorial resources—needed to prosecute criminal behavior that now 
 
108 See Restoring Key Tools to Combat Fraud and Corruption After the Supreme Court’s 
Skilling Decision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13, 15 (2010) 
(statement of Professor Samuel Buell, Duke University School of Law) (arguing that the 
securities, mail, and wire fraud statutes do not reach “serious, novel forms of intangible 
harm” such as self-dealing). 
109 Id.; Sheyn, supra note 101, at 31.   
110 See, e.g., In re Lampe, 665 F.3d 506, 521 (3d Cir. 2011). 
111 Sheyn, supra note 101, at 55. 
112 Id. 
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falls outside of the federal honest-services statute.113  Partially because the 
honest-services fraud statute has been in place for twenty-five years and 
partially for other reasons discussed below, many states do not have 
sophisticated fraud statutes that punish “intangible services” fraud cases.  
Indeed, those states that follow the Model Penal Code do not even have 
mail or wire fraud provisions.114 
The issue of prosecutorial resources is also a significant impediment to 
state law enforcement filling the void left by Skilling.  First, state 
prosecutors lack the expertise and experience of federal prosecutors in 
working on honest-services fraud cases.  From a lack of opportunity and 
exposure, state prosecutors in many cases would have a significant learning 
curve in prosecuting white-collar fraud cases.  The extra resources needed 
to develop this expertise also make states unlikely to successfully fill the 
gap left by Skilling. 
Second, most honest-services prosecutions involve state or local 
officials.115  As a result, the incentive for local and state prosecutors to 
pursue such cases is far less than that of the federal government. When 
investigating and prosecuting corruption cases, it is better that outside 
individuals perform the prosecutorial function.  If the cases do not involve 
bribery and kickbacks, the state prosecutors may be in the politically 
uncomfortable position of prosecuting their fellow state government 
employees.  This is perhaps even truer in smaller communities where 
prosecuting a company that employs most of the residents would be 
political suicide.  The incentives for local prosecutors to pursue white-collar 
crimes, like honest-services fraud, often become diminished in light of local 
political realities. 
3. Congressional Barriers to Reform 
One common response to Skilling is that Congress can remedy the 
harm caused by the use of the avoidance canon by simply passing a revised 
version of the statute.  While this is perhaps true as a theoretical matter, 
there are a number of obstacles to a simple congressional remedy.  First, 
because the Court did not strike down the statute or otherwise provide any 
indication as to what language would satisfy the void-for-vagueness 
constitutional requirement, Congress does not have clear guidance on how 
 
113 There is, for instance, no general fraud provision in the Model Penal Code, upon 
which many state criminal codes are based.  Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. 
REV. 729, 746–47 (1999). 
114 See id. 
115 See generally George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?—Mail Fraud, 
State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225 (1997) (exploring the federalism 
tensions related to prosecution of state and local officials in mail fraud cases). 
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to remedy the statute without creating the same constitutional problem 
again.  Indeed, Congress attempted to fix a vagueness problem when it 
passed the current version of the statute in response to the Supreme Court’s 
1987 decision in United States v. McNally. 
Second, because the Court failed to provide any guidance as to the 
scope of the prohibition against void-for-vagueness in Skilling, Congress 
will have a difficult time identifying the level of specificity required for a 
new statute to pass constitutional muster.  The use of the canon, then, only 
exacerbates the difficulty of defining this type of fraud, given its inherently 
intangible nature. 
Finally, and perhaps more disconcerting, the current atmosphere of 
gridlock, including the previously common use of the filibuster in the 
Senate, makes the likelihood of passing a new statute slim.  Indeed, the 
Congress has held hearings about how to respond to Skilling but has not 
been able to pass a new statute.116 
V. A NEW MODEL FOR THE AVOIDANCE CANON 
Given this Article’s central argument that the Court should not apply 
the avoidance canon to void-for-vagueness challenges to federal criminal 
statutes, the question remains whether there are other constitutional 
challenges to criminal statutes for which the Court should avoid the 
avoidance canon.  Certainly, a complete investigation of the avoidance 
canon’s applicability to various constitutional challenges to criminal 
statutes is beyond the scope of the Article.  Nonetheless, this Article 
concludes by suggesting some guiding principles for ascertaining whether 
to apply the canon to federal criminal statutes. 
At the heart of the problem of applying the avoidance canon to void-
for-vagueness constitutional challenges was that, as explained in Part IV 
above, doing so undermines the canon’s goals.  The corollary principle is 
also true—answering the constitutional question better serves the goals of 
the canon.  To the extent, then, that one views the goals of the avoidance 
canon as important in deciding how the Court ought to address 
constitutional issues, such goals ought to drive the use of the canon.  In 
other words, in deciding whether the avoidance canon is an appropriate tool 
to use in evaluating a federal criminal statute, the Court should ask whether 
using the canon would accomplish its aims. 
In practice, the Court should assess whether it could advance the 
interests of judicial restraint better by using the avoidance canon or 
avoiding it.  With an ambiguous statute, as indicated above, this inquiry can 
cut both ways.  Nonetheless, the Court must inquire as to what approach 
 
116 Id. at 49–51. 
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(using the canon or not) would best advance the underlying value.  Second 
and perhaps more important is the penumbral value of using the avoidance 
canon to give broader meaning to underenforced constitutional norms.  The 
avoidance canon accomplishes this, of course, by leaving the statute’s 
meaning ambiguous and not articulating the applicable constitutional limit 
on Congress.  Part of this calculus would include the degree to which one 
could characterize that norm as underenforced.  The more underenforced 
the norm, the stronger the case for applying the avoidance canon. 
This model, then, advocates using the goals of the canon to determine 
whether application is appropriate with respect to a particular constitutional 
challenge.  When applying the canon serves the purposes of judicial 
restraint and providing penumbral value to constitutional norms, its 
application is thus appropriate.  When use of the canon does not serve these 
purposes, or even worse, undermines these purposes, the Court should not 
use the avoidance canon. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the clear difference between statutory vagueness and 
ambiguity, the Article advanced the argument that courts should not use the 
canon of avoidance to address questions of vagueness.  Using the Skilling 
case as an example, the Article demonstrated the harm created when a court 
confuses questions of vagueness with questions of ambiguity.  Further, the 
Article demonstrated the adverse theoretical and political consequences of 
misusing the canon and described their resulting conclusions, the most 
ironic of which is that the best way to achieve the purposes of the canon is 
to avoid the avoidance canon altogether.  Tying the application of the canon 
to the purposes it purports to achieve will prevent the Court from 
undermining the important goals of the canon through its misuse. 
 
